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This program aims to expand the knowledge base regarding the relationship 
between the operation of customary justice systems and the legal empowerment 
of poor and marginalized populations, and identify entry points and tools of 
engagement for working with customary justice systems to strengthen legal 
empowerment. Such knowledge will be generated through a number of individual 
research projects based in Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Papua 
New Guinea, Liberia and Uganda. These research projects seek to evaluate 
programmatic interventions designed to enhance legal empowerment through 
improved operation of customary justice systems with a view to collecting 
empirical data on the effectiveness of such approaches, lessons learned and best 
practices. The results will be brought together in two publications that will be 
disseminated among international and national legal practitioners, country 
specialists and development actors working in the areas of customary justice 
and/or legal empowerment. 
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developing countries and their effectiveness in contributing to good governance 
and development. Our research employs a socio-legal approach to develop 
insights into the workings of national legal systems in their historical, social and 
political contexts. It includes both state law and legal institutions, as well as 
customary and religious normative systems, with a special focus on access to 
justice. In our research projects the processes of law-making, administrative 
implementation, enforcement and dispute resolution have a prominent place. 
Local case studies help us to find out how law functions in society.  
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Introduction 
 
In the last few decades, tradition, or at least what has always been portrayed as 
tradition, has proved to be resilient, and in many countries customary justice 
systems1 have returned to the fore. Africa is a prime example of where chiefs and 
customary law continue to dominate or have came back.2 But also in many Asian 
and Latin American countries, customary justice systems are vital; one need only 
think of the role of adat in Indonesia3, the Lok Adalat tribunals in India4, or the 
disputes over recognition of customary indigenous group rights in Bolivia or 
Columbia5. Customary law even plays a role in Northern America and Australia 
where there have been intense struggles surrounding the recognition of ‘native’ 
group rights.6 
 
At the same time, customary justice systems have over the last decade or more 
become an increasing priority for international organizations working on legal 
development cooperation.7 Examples include the use of Gacaca courts to deal 
with the immense number of suspects of the Rwandan genocide,8 and projects 
aimed at bridging customary and state tenure systems to create capitalization of 
customary land resources following the influential work of Peruvian economist 
Hernando de Soto.9 One can also think of organizations that seek to improve the 
position of women in customary settings, for example through changing national 
legislation governing customary law, legal awareness training, or local level civil 
society engagement by paralegals.10 
 
                                                
1 There is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes customary law. In general, it could be 
said that customary systems of justice refer to the types of justice systems that exist at the local or 
community level which have not been set up by the state, and that derive their legitimacy from the 
mores, values, and traditions of the indigenous ethnic group. Although they are often indicated by the 
term ‘informal’ or ‘non-state’, they do not exist unrelated to, and function independently from state 
legal systems. On the contrary customary and state legal systems mutually define each other in their 
many interactions.  
2 B Oomen, Chiefs in South Africa: Law, Power, and Culture in the Post-Apartheid Era (2005). 
3 T Murray Li, 'Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource Politics and the Tribal Slot' 
(2000) 42(1) Comparative Studies in Society and History 149-79. 
4 M Galanter and J K Krishnan, 'Debased Informalism: Lok Adalats and Legal Rightsin Modern India' in 
E G Jensen and T C Heller (eds.) Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of 
Law, (2003). 
5 R Sieder (ed.) Multiculturalism in latin America, Indigenous Rights, Diversity and Democracy (2002); 
W Assies, G van der Haar and A Hoekema (eds.) The Challenge of Diversity, Indigenous Peoples and 
Reform of the State in Latin America (2000). 
6 A Kuper, 'The Return of the Native' (2003) 44(3) Current Anthropology 389-402; C Machlachlan, 
'The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law: Pluralism Beyond the Colonial Paradigm-A review 
article' (1998) 37(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 368-86; M J Matsuda, 'Native 
Custom and Official Law in Hawaii' (1988) 3 Internationales Jahrbuch für Rechtsanthropologie 135-46. 
7 See for instance E Wojkowska, Doing Justice: How Informal Justice Systems Can Contribute (2006); 
UNDP, Programming for Justice: Access for All: A practitioner's guide to a human rights-based 
approach to access to justice (2005); CLEP, Making the Law Work for Everyone, Volume 1 Report from 
the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor (2008); DFID, Non-state Justice and Security 
Systems. DFID Briefing (2004). 
8 See for instance B Oomen, 'Donor-driven Justice: The case of Rwanda' (2005) 36(5) Development & 
Change 887-910. 
9 H De Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else 
(2001). 
10 Wojkowska, above n 7. 
TOWARDS CUSTOMARY LEGAL EMPOWERMENT 
 
2 
Donor organizations not only recognize the importance of customary justice 
systems, but also try to overcome a number of negative aspects of such systems 
so that they function better for marginalized groups in the communities they 
govern, safeguard human rights, and become more suited to modern day 
economic structures and help to stimulate economic development. This approach, 
geared towards improving the internal functioning of customary justice systems 
for community members, should be distinguished from the issue of recognition 
and protection of customary group rights by the state, which is not addressed in 
this paper.  
 
Facilitating change in the internal functioning of customary justice systems, 
however, is a difficult task and customary justice systems have proved to be 
highly resilient. This paper seeks to understand why this is the case and to outline 
what role research can play in improving donor engagement with customary law. 
First, it examines why donors have increasingly engaged with customary law and 
what changes they have sought. Second it discusses two general approaches for 
facilitating improvements in customary justice systems: stimulating linkages 
between customary and state justice systems and community-based activities 
directed at citizens governed largely by customary justice systems.  
 
The paper concludes that apart from the complex nature of customary justice 
systems, power imbalances and resultant elite capture of or resistance to external 
change undermines donor-led improvements in customary justice systems. It 
argues for a concentrated research effort into combinations of state and 
community-based activities and their effects on change agents that can help 
overcome power imbalances. Such research should produce recommendations 
that can lead to Customary Legal Empowerment11: processes that 1) enhance the 
operation of customary justice systems by improving the representation and 
participation of marginalized community members, and integrating safeguards 
aimed at protecting the rights and security of marginalized community members 
and/or 2) improve the ability of marginalized community members to make use 
of customary justice systems to uphold their rights and obtain outcomes that are 
fair and equitable.  
 
Why engage with customary law? 
 
Traditionally, donor-led legal reform projects have emphasized formal institutions, 
such as the judiciary, legislators, the police, and prisons, and paid less attention 
to customary justice systems. The prominence of customary justice systems has 
often been regarded as incompatible with the modern nation-state and therefore 
as something to be discouraged or ignored rather than strengthened or engaged 
with. 12  However, a growing body of evidence suggests that poor people in 
developing countries have limited access to the formal legal system and that their 
lives are largely governed by customary norms and institutions.13  
                                                
11 In our definition customary legal empowerment refers to empowerment of customary community 
members within the customary system. This should be distinguished from the protection of customary 
group rights versus powerful outsiders such as the state or large skill investors, which is also often 
discussed in terms of legal empowerment. The latter type of cases mainly involve the recognition and 
protection of customary group rights by the state and not the internal functioning of customary justice 
systems, which is the topic of this paper. 
12 L Chirayath, C Sage, and M Woolcock, 'Customary law and policy reform: Engaging with the 
plurality of justice systems' (Prepared as a background paper for the World Development Report 2006: 
Equity and Development, 2005).  
13 Poor people’s use of customary justice systems may reflect the limited access to and weakness of 
the formal justice systems rather than an active choice for customary systems based on their 
satisfaction with these systems (See SDC, Rule of law, justice sector reforms and development 
cooperation, SDC concept paper (2008) 3. 
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As such, customary justice systems play a much more important role in the lives 
of many of the world’s poor than state justice systems. One study refers to 
figures collected by development cooperation departments in Britain and 
Denmark, indicating that in some countries up to 80 percent of the population 
lives under customary justice systems and has little to no contact with state law. 
14 These figures are corroborated by findings from academics studying African law 
showing that customary law ‘governs the daily lives of more than three quarters 
of the populations of most African countries’, 15 while according to one author ‘up 
to 90 percent of cases in Nigeria are settled by customary courts.’ 16  
 
Customary justice systems are thus the lived reality of most people in developing 
countries, especially in rural areas. This can be explained on the one hand by 
choice, in cases where people select customary legal institutions over state 
institutions for their positive attributes. On the other hand, it can be explained by 
necessity, in localities and cases where limited penetration of state institutions or 
lack of access to these institutions is combined with strong or at least stronger 
local presence of customary institutions.  
 
Positive attributes associated with customary justice systems include physical 
accessibility, the use of familiar procedures and language, the limited costs 
involved in bringing a case, the short duration of case resolution, knowledge 
among the dispute settlers of the local context, and the more restorative nature 
of the process. Less positive aspects include social pressure on disputants not to 
refer a dispute to a state court and disputants’ fear of reprisal or social ostracism 
should they enter the formal justice system.  
 
Notwithstanding the importance of customary dispute settlement for the majority 
of the poor, the prominence of customary law in first instance lies in its regulation 
of important aspects of daily life, such as access to land, natural resource 
management, and family issues such as inheritance and marriage, more than in 
the settlement of occasional disputes. In fact, the administrative power and 
dispute settlement power of traditional leaders are intrinsically connected, in the 
sense that “(a)ny resident living under their jurisdiction who wishes to appeal a 
‘judgment’ of theirs must think very carefully what the cost of that decision is 
going to be. Given the fact that they and their extended family may need the 
chief’s goodwill for a future decision in relation to local government functions — 
allocation of land, invitation to be an nduna (advisor), inclusion in a development 
project, referral to any other government service — all these decisions are 
interrelated”17. Several of the positive attributes mentioned — including physical 
presence, familiarity with local context and limited costs — are also applicable to 
customary administration. Especially in debates regarding natural resource 
management, food availability, and natural resource depletion and degradation, 
there are strong proponents of customary law. They contend that the involvement 
of local people and their local normative systems enhances sustainable 
development. Local communities, it is put, have a tradition of living close to 
nature and can thus provide insights into resource allocation, development and 
management that would not be exploited if a purely state-centric approach were 
adopted. In addition, the study of ‘common pool resources’ management argues 
                                                
14 S Golub, 'A House without Foundation' in T Carothers (ed.) Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In 
Search of Knowledge (2006) 105-36. 
 15C Sage and M Woolcock (eds.) The World Bank Legal Review: Law, Equity and Development, Vol. 2 
(2006). 
 16C A Odinkalu 'Poor Justice or Justice for the Poor? A Policy Framework for Reform of Customary and 
Informal Justice Systems in Africa' in Sage and Woolcock, above n 15, 141-165.  
17 W Schärf, Non-state justice systems in Southern Africa: how should governments respond? (2003). 
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that customary, communal, natural resource management systems are more 
efficient and effective than their private or state alternatives.18  
 
The limited effect of reforms in the state justice sector on the majority of the poor, 
coupled with increased recognition of the wide reach and accessibility of 
customary justice systems has led to a changing attitude among donors towards 
customary justice systems, and an interest to build on their positive elements for 
the benefit of the poor. Such an approach is consistent with the rise of so-called 
‘bottom-up’ legal development cooperation approaches19, which seek to directly 
reach the poor or marginalized groups through their interventions, instead of 
hoping that state law reform projects ‘trickle down’ to benefit those at the bottom 
of developing societies.  
 
This new donor engagement not only focuses on enhancing the positive aspects 
of customary justice systems, but also tries to overcome a number of negative 
aspects of such systems. Customary justice systems can be susceptible to elite 
capture. In a setting of mediated or negotiated dispute settlement domination by 
existing power holders can be detrimental to the poor and disempowered. 
Discussing options for alternative dispute resolution based on customary 
institutions in Africa, Nader states “if there is any single generalization that has 
ensued from the anthropological research on disputing processes it is that 
mediation and negotiation require conditions of relatively equal power.”20 She 
therefore argues that customary dispute resolution can only work if it is backed 
up by state law and if there is a possibility of state law as a last resort: “The ideal 
of equal justice is incompatible with the social realities of unequal power so that 
disputing without the force of law is doomed for failure”.21 In its study of access 
to justice based law reforms, UNDP similarly finds that traditional and indigenous 
justice systems are susceptible to elite capture and may “serve to reinforce 
existing hierarchies and social structures at the expense of disadvantaged 
groups.”22 A World Bank sponsored study of dispute resolution in Indonesia, 
carried out within the World Bank’s Justice for All program, made similar 
conclusions. It found that while villagers preferred to solve disputes informally 
and outside of state structures, such dispute resolution was not successful in 
cases where there were large power imbalances between the parties.23 Elite 
capture is especially problematic when customary checks and balances, such as 
procedures to depose malfunctioning chiefs, have eroded.   
 
In studies dealing with customary land management the danger of elite capture 
has also been widely recognized. A number of studies regarding customary tenure 
in African countries reveal the social differentiation within communities and 
emphasize the importance of power structures. They describe internal processes 
of contestation, assertion and transformation and portray political struggles to 
define and redefine social relations in the customary sphere. A number of these 
studies demonstrate that local elites have been able to use their position and the 
ambiguities of customary law to appropriate land to further their own economic 
and political interests. This includes traditional leaders who have ruled arbitrarily, 
                                                
 18 F Von Benda-Beckmann, 'The Multiple Edges of Law: Dealing with Legal Pluralism in Development 
Practice' in Sage and Woolcock, above n 15, 51-86; E Ostrom, 'Private and Common Property Rights' 
in B Bouckaert and G de Geest (eds.) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (1999); UNDP, above n 7. 
19 B Van Rooij, Bringing Justice to the Poor: Bottom-Up Legal Development Cooperation, Working 
Paper (2009) available at <http://ssrn.com/paper=1368185>. 
20 L Nader, 'The Underside of Conflict Management ― in Africa and Elsewhere' (2001) 32(1) IDS 
Bulletin  19-28. 
21 Ibid. 
 22 UNDP, above n 7, 101. 
23 World Bank, Village Justice in Indonesia: Case Studies on Access to Justice, Village Democracy and 
Governance (2004). See Asian Development Bank, Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development 
Bank (2001) 66. 
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with few checks and balances on their administration, giving power considerations 
precedence over objectives of development. 24  Given that state systems can 
equally be captured by particular elites, a switch from customary to state law or 
disputing systems will not automatically solve this problem. Instead, both 
systems need to be harnessed against elite capture, incorporating proper checks 
and balances, stronger participation in norm formation, and guarantees for 
impartiality of adjudicators. This may be equally, if not more challenging to do in 
customary than in state law. 
 
A second issue is that customary law and customary dispute settlement and 
administration may violate human rights standards and constitutional provisions. 
This is partly caused by the fact that judges and community members are often 
not aware of human rights standards such as the right to equality and the right of 
non-discrimination. Another problem is that customary criminal procedures do not 
necessarily provide victims and suspects with minimal standards of protection or 
procedural rules of due process and evidence.25 Further, some local norms and 
practices, such as public humiliation and physical violence, or institutionalized 
discrimination of certain groups derived from traditional values and hierarchal 
notions may directly contradict human rights standards. A typical example is 
where customary justice systems lack gender equality and violate rights of non-
discrimination. Customary systems are widely regarded as patriarchal and 
therefore “systematically deny women’s rights to assets or opportunities”. 26 
Customary gender perspectives may even be so deeply inculcated that they 
“leave many women (…) resigned to being treated as inferior as a matter of fate, 
with no alternative but to accept their situation.”27 This critique is levelled both 
against processes of customary dispute settlement and customary administration. 
Dispute settlement issues include that courts may lack female judges, women 
face cultural impediments to participate in court debates, and in some cases are 
even required to have their interests represented by their husbands or male 
relatives. Customary administration issues include that most leadership positions 
are held by men and that land ownership is often vested in men, while women 
exercise only derived rights. Such norms and practices operate to create a gender 
bias in, for instance, cases of inheritance and divorce. Some studies see the 
gender bias of customary law as an incorrigible trait, and advocate for a complete 
disengagement with customary law.28 Others reason that customary systems will 
not disappear in the near future, and therefore the issue of reform should be 
taken seriously.29 The latter view is well received by legal reformers. 
 
                                                
24 K S Amanor, Land, Labour and the Family in Southern Ghana: a Critique of Land Policy under Neo-
Liberalisation (2001) 127. K S Amanor, 'Global Restructuring and Land Rights in Ghana' in Research 
Report No 108 (1999) 156. S Berry, 'Chiefs Know Their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and 
the Past in Asante, 1896-1996' in A Isaacman and J Allman (eds.) Social history of Africa (2001); J 
Carney and M Watts, 'Manufacturing dissent: work, gender and the politics of meaning in a peasant 
society' (1990) 60(2) Africa 207-41; E Daley, and M Hobley, 'Land: Changing Contexts, Changing 
Relationships, Changing Rights' (Paper prepared for the Urban-Rural Change Team, DFID, 2005); K 
Juul, and C Lund, Negotiating Property in Africa (2002); Oomen, above n 2;  P E Peters, 'The limits of 
negotiability: Security, equity and class formation in Africa's legal systems' in K Juul and C Lund (eds.) 
Negotiating Property in Africa (2002) 45-66;  J C Ribot, 'Local actors, powers and accountability in 
African decentralisation: A review of issues' (2001) Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review; A Whitehead and D Tsikata, 'Policy discourses on women's land rights in sub-Saharan Africa: 
The implications of the re-turn to the customary' (2003) 3(1) Journal of Agrarian Change 67-112; P 
Woodhouse, 'African enclosures: A default mode of development' (2003) 31(10) World Development  
1705-20. 
25 UNDP, above n 7.  
26 Chirayath, Sage, and Woolcock, above n 12, 4. 
27 Asian Development Bank, above n 23, 31-32. 
28 L S Khadiagala, 'The failure of popular justice in Uganda: Local councils and women's property 
rights' (2001) 32 Development and Change 55-76; Whitehead and Tsikata, above n 24. 
29 See C Nyamu-Musembi, 'Review of experience in engaging with 'non-state' justice systems in East 
Africa' (Paper commissioned by Governance Division, 2003) 27. 
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A third problem is that customary systems are deemed of limited effect in 
stimulating economic development. This view has been debated since the colonial 
period, but is now commonly linked to the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto. 
He argues that most property and businesses of the poor are regulated in 
informal (non-state) normative systems and are not formally recognized by state 
law. This excludes them from participation in larger markets and hampers their 
access to formal loans. 30  Proponents of this view hold that “(e)conomic 
transactions remain unpredictable, insecure, and limited” 31  and that assets 
regulated under a customary regime will not be linked to capital markets and thus 
remain underdeveloped. De Soto thus propounds the idea of finding bridges 
between informal non-state property arrangements and an accessible system of 
formal state law.32 De Soto’s work, while often criticized,33 has become influential 
in law and development studies, and even more so among policy makers.   
 
Thus, while there is growing recognition of the importance of customary justice 
systems, there are a number of issues regarding their operation that need to be 
addressed, including elite capture, human rights protection, and, in certain cases, 
the integration of non-state arrangements in wider capital markets. It is on these 
issues that legal reform projects could possibly play a role.  
 
The complexity of customary justice systems  
 
If interventions aimed at improving the operation of customary justice systems 
are to be effective, development actors must understand and address the 
complex nature of these systems. Central to this complexity is the difficulty in 
identifying the appropriate norm that applies to certain behavior or to a dispute at 
hand.  
 
First of all there are multiple types of customary law. In many countries one can 
distinguish between codified customary law, judicial customary law, textbook 
customary law, and living customary law.34 Codified customary law refers to 
legislation codifying the customary law of a certain jurisdiction, thus providing 
legal certainty and accessibility to the customary law, while at the same time 
unifying, simplifying and ‘freezing’ it, often in a formal language that is quite 
different from that used in the original community. Judicial customary law refers 
to the norms developed by judges when applying customary norms in courts and 
as laid down in national law reports. Here also, customary law is made more 
certain and accessible but at the same time can be frozen, unified and formalized. 
Textbook customary law refers to authoritative texts written by state 
administrators or anthropologists, often used by state courts or administrators 
when trying to ascertain appropriate customary norms. Textbook customary law 
offers a non-legal and less formalistic source on the appropriate customary law, 
and one that can offer more room for different customary norms in different 
communities. The drawbacks of textbook customary law include that they only 
exist for certain groups and therefore fail to provide as much legal certainty, and 
also that they freeze the norms of the groups discussed. Finally, living customary 
law refers to the norms that govern daily life in the community at the local level. 
Between these different versions of customary law there may be considerable 
difference, especially between the living and written versions, as living customary 
norms are inherently dynamic.  
                                                
30 De Soto, above n 9. 
31 CLEP, above n 7, 26.  
32 De Soto, above n 9. 
 33 The vast body of mainly specialist land tenure related work remains outside the scope of this paper. 
34 For an overview of the literature see J M Ubink, In the Land of the Chiefs, Customary Law, Land 
Conflicts, and the Role of the State in Peri-Urban Ghana (2008); Oomen, above n 2. 
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Today, there is increased recognition that engagement with customary justice 
systems implies engaging with living customary law, as written versions of 
customary law may be as alien in local communities as state law. Ascertaining the 
norms of living customary law presents its own challenges. A first problem lies in 
what questions to ask in order to determine the living customary law. Different 
questions may lead to different answers and thus different norms. For example, 
one could ask a community member directly what the appropriate norm is, or 
pose a hypothetical question asking what would happen in a fictional case. 
Alternatively, one could try to ascertain the appropriate norm empirically by 
gathering data about what norms are applied in disputes35 or what norms are 
observed in daily life outside of exceptional dispute cases.36 Asking directly or 
hypothetically, however, may lead to answers that portray an idealized norm that 
is seldom practiced.37 Further, norms derived from dispute practices may be 
different and exceptional when compared to those observed in daily life.38 And it 
may be difficult to distill customary norms solely by investigating disputes or 
observed behavior. 39  Ideally one requires a combination of these methods, 
designed in such a way that they offer sufficient representation and validity, a 
process that can easily become expensive and time consuming. Even when 
thorough research has been conducted there is no certainty that a single 
appropriate norm may be identified as the methods may produce different results.  
  
This complexity is compounded by the fact that within living customary law there 
again can exist different or competing versions of particular norms both between 
and within different communities or customary groups.40 This is especially so in 
contexts where large economic or social transformations have occurred that have 
altered the social fabric and economic structures of the community, giving rise to 
competing values about, for instance, the position of women or what should be 
done with proceeds from newly available lucrative land deals.41 For this reason, 
who within the local community is asked about applicable customary norms, is 
critical. Relying solely on elite representatives, such as chiefs or elders, may 
easily lead to a biased representation of living customary norms, not only failing 
to capture the existing variety, but worse failing to understand the versions that 
may benefit sub-altern community members. The unwritten character of living 
customary law, especially where contested and competing versions exist, imbeds 
a high level of flexibility in customary justice systems.  
  
Apart from the different types and versions of customary laws, customary justice 
systems are particular for their flexibility and negotiability, even where norms are 
clear. It can be generally said that customary justice systems do not aim to 
resolve disputes through adjudication, deciding who wins and loses, but through 
mediation, seeking to facilitate a settlement that is acceptable to the parties. In 
this process customary norms do not serve to produce direct outcomes but are 
the starting points for discussions leading towards settlements. Some see such 
negotiability and the aims towards settlement and mediation as opening up 
access to justice even for marginalized community members; others, however, 
                                                
35 Following the dispute method, advanced first by Llewellyn and Hoebel. See K N Llewellyn and E A 
Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way. Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence (1941). 
36 Following Holleman’s trouble-less case method. J F Holleman, 'Trouble-Cases and Trouble-Less 
Cases in the Study of Customary Law and Legal Reform' (1973) 7 Law and Society Review 585-609. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 J L Comaroff and S Roberts, Rules and Processes: The Cultural Logic of Dispute in an African 
Context (1981). 
40 M Chanock, 'Neither customary nor legal: African customary law in an era of family law reform' 
(1989) 3 International Journal of Law and the Family 172-87. 
41 See for example H Becker, "'New Things after Independence": Gender and Traditional Authorities in 
Postcolonial Namibia' (2006) 32(1) Journal of Southern Africa Studies 29-48; Ubink, above n 34.  
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point out that in practice not everything is negotiable and that some are in a 
better bargaining position than others.  
  
Legal development actors, and the state and non-state organizations they work 
with, often lack knowledge about the different versions of living customary norms, 
the negotiable nature of customary justice, and the implications this has for 
engagement with customary justice systems. Time and resource constraints 
easily result in quick studies that accept elite representations of customary law. 
Such accounts can overlook the fact that there are different versions of such law 
or that the elite version is contested. Projects that adopt such norms as their 
starting point may actually be strengthening the position of elites in the 
community while weakening the marginalized group they seek to empower. 
Likewise, power differentials may be strengthened where the negotiable nature of 
customary law is not taken into account and efforts subsequently fail to focus on 
harnessing weaker parties in the negotiated settlement processes.  
 
In the next sections, this paper discusses two general approaches for facilitating 
improvements in customary justice systems: stimulating linkages between 
customary and state justice systems, and community-based activities directed at 
citizens governed by customary justice systems. It proceeds to demonstrate how 
the different and complex character of customary law impacts on and offers 
challenges and opportunities for customary legal empowerment. 
 
The institutional approach: linking customary and state justice systems 
 
An important method to improve the functioning of customary justice systems, 
and one used since colonial times, is to develop institutional linkages between 
state and customary justice systems. There are three types of linkages: linkages 
between state and customary norms, linkages between state and customary 
dispute resolution mechanisms, and linkages between state and customary 
administration. Such linkages have the potential to incorporate human rights into 
customary norms, dispute resolution and administration, and to create checks 
and balances against elite capture. Linking customary and state justice systems is 
also seen as a means of assisting the poor to capitalize on their informally owned 
assets and help stimulate economic growth in customary settings.42   
 
Norms 
 
The weakest institutional normative linkage is state recognition of customary law 
by, for example, a provision in the constitution or in another relevant law relating 
to the application of customary law.43 This is not, however, what is meant by a 
linkage aimed at improving customary justice systems, as it does little to deal 
with the issues mentioned above. A stronger institutional normative linkage can 
be created through the codification of customary norms into state legislation. This 
involves a process of selecting between the different versions of customary law 
(as happens in any type of codification)44 through which those norms deemed 
unfavourable in terms of human rights, protection of marginalized groups or the 
stimulation of economic activity can be adapted or discarded. Codification has the 
additional benefit of making complex and varied norms more certain and 
accessible, including to those outside of local communities or those lacking the 
research resources necessary to understand local norms. As such, codification 
                                                
42 Chanock, above n 40. 
43 See D Fitzpatrick, "'Best Practice" Options for the Legal Recognition of Customary Tenure' (2005) 
36(3) Development and Change 36, 449-75, 457. 
44 For an explanation of this see B Van Rooij, Law's Dimension, Understanding Legal Failure Spatially 
(Y Yan trans 2004) 109-17 [trans of Falü de Weidu, Cong Kongjianshang Jiedu Falü Shibai].  
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could theoretically help support economic activities between the community and 
external markets, hence stimulating economic growth. Those serious about 
engaging with living customary law are often hesitant about codification as it can 
affect the fluid, informal and accessible character of the original customary 
norms.45 Additionally, codification without a proper study of the variations of 
customary norms within a community, and especially when sub-altern versions 
are not taken into account, may unconsciously strengthen the norms governing 
elite interests. Moreover, codification of customary norms faces grave problems of 
credibility and acceptability, and might be ignored by many as not reflecting their 
rules of customary law.46 Ultimately, such codification may then lead to another 
layer of written customary law while doing little to address the problems within 
the living customary justice system. 
 
Dispute resolution mechanisms 
 
There are two main possibilities for linking customary and state dispute resolution 
mechanisms. The first is through incorporating customary dispute settlers into the 
court structure. This can be done by establishing customary courts presided over 
by traditional authorities as the first tier of the legal system. Thus incorporated, 
traditional authorities can then be required to administer justice in accordance 
with certain procedures and while maintaining human rights standards. When a 
system of appeal is established, this opens up possibilities for state courts to 
oversee the adjudicative work of customary courts, and for the development of 
checks and balances that can ensure adherence to such procedures and 
substantive standards. The question is whether such checks and balances would 
work in practice. First, citizens may not be able to invoke their rights in state 
courts even when the right of appeal exists as the basic conditions required for 
access are still lacking. Second, appeal judgements may do little to affect the 
work of customary dispute settlers outside of the case in question.47  
 
When customary law is recognized as a source of law, state courts can adjudicate 
cases on the basis of customary rules, creating a second type of disputing linkage 
that may improve the functioning of customary justice systems. The advantage 
here is that state judges may be well placed to safeguard human rights and fair 
procedural standards when applying customary law. This also diminishes 
opportunities for elite cooptation. Due to their written character, state customary 
judgements may offer increased certainty and accessibility inside as well as 
outside of the local community, thereby enabling larger scale economic 
exchanges. On the other hand, state courts are less accessible, especially to 
marginalized citizens, and their judgments may have limited impact on living 
customary norms.48 The formal character of state court decisions is exacerbated 
as many judges are trained to base their decisions on written texts and thus 
prefer to apply codified or judicial customary law (based on earlier decisions) 
rather than attempt to understand and apply living customary law. The South 
African Constitutional Court has recognized this problem and encourages judges 
to apply living law by providing that living customary law can overrule codified 
versions.49 This opens up an additional set of problems however, as judges have 
                                                
45 Ubink, above n 34; J M Ubink, The Quest For Customary Law in African State Courts  (Forthcoming).  
46 See Ubink, abive n 34.  
47 J M Ubink, 'Courts and peri-urban practice: Customary land law in Ghana' (2002-2004) XXII 
University of Ghana law journal 25-77. 
48 J B Danquah, Gold Coast: Akan Laws and Customs and the Akim Abuakwa Constitution (1928); I 
Schapera, A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom: Compiled for the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
Administration (1938). 
49 Bhe & others v Magistrate Khayelitsha & others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC), 2005 (1) BCLR 1 and Alexkor 
Ltd & another v Richtersveld Community & others 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC). See also T Bennet, 
"'Official” vs “living” customary law: dillammas of description and recognition’ in A Claassens and B 
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to somehow identify what the living norms are, often by relying on (expert) 
witnesses or assessors. 50  Ideally, such aids would have knowledge of local 
culture, language and customs, and could inform the state judge on a case-by-
case basis as to the appropriate norm. While in theory this method could help 
preserve the original and fluid nature of the customary norms to be practiced in 
state courts, several problems may impact upon the impartiality of such state 
adjudication. First, impartiality of local experts may be especially difficult when 
norms are contested and when there are different customary norms at play. 
Second, the particular nature of customary norms, with their inherent informality, 
flexibility and negotiability, plus the inherent unpredictability of dispute 
settlements, does not accommodate the precision and certainty generally 
required by assessors and expert witnesses when testifying about customary 
norms in court proceedings.51 The integration of state and non-state law in state 
courts is thus highly difficult and can lead to situations where court decisions are 
out of step with local realities and thus have limited impact. Alternatively, they 
can result in courts strengthening existing elites who may play a dominant role in 
providing information, especially about contested norms.  
 
Administration 
 
A third form of state and customary institutional linkages that may improve the 
functioning of customary justice systems is by linking state and customary 
administration. Administration needs to be addressed as it plays an important 
role in the implementation of customary law. Moreover, customary administrators 
can be involved in local power abuses or human rights violations. Linking 
customary and state administration should ideally increase the accountability of 
customary administration, prevent power abuse and human rights violations, and 
enable a form of local administration that facilitates economic growth. However, it 
should do so without undermining the legitimacy of customary administrators that 
enables them to be a locally accessible form of governance that performs 
important social, economic and cultural services.52 There are four main ways that 
state and customary administration can be linked.53 First, the state can recognize 
customary administration without defining official roles for traditional leaders, nor 
interfering with their activities as long as the law is not broken.54 This, however, 
does little to reform customary administration. For this to occur a more elaborate 
linkage is necessary, for example, by integrating customary administrators into 
the state administration system and delegating to them formal state functions.55 
Third, the state can establish a parallel local state structure that exists alongside 
the customary administration, aiming to achieve a local balance of power. Fourth, 
hybrid local structures in which both state and customary administrators are 
represented can be established. 
                                                                                                                                       
Cousins (eds.) Land, Power and Custom. Controversies generated by South Africa's Communal Land 
Rights Act(2008) 138-153.  
50 Llewellyn and Hoebel, above n 35.  
51 A N Allott, 'The people as law-makers: custom, practice, and public opinion as sources of law in 
Africa and England' (1977) 21(1) Journal of African Law 1-23. 
52 J M Ubink, Traditional authorities in Africa: Resurgence in an era of democratisation, Research and 
Policy Note (2008). 11 For an elaborate debate about why African states have welcomed the 
resurgence of traditional authorities see P Englebert, 'Patterns and theories of traditional resurgence in 
tropical Africa' (2002) 30(118) Mondes en Développement 51-64; G Lutz, and W Linder, 'Traditional 
Structures in Local Governance for Local Development' (2004) 52.  
53 For an overview of this see Ubink, above n 52;  N Bako-Arifari, 'Traditional local institutions, social 
capital and the process of decentralisation. A typology of government policies in developing countries' 
in Working papers on African societies (1999) 5-15; B Hlatshwayo, 'Harmonizing traditional and 
elected structures at the local level: Experiences of four Southern African Development Community 
countries' in F M d'Engelbronner-Kolff, M O Hinz and J L Sindano (eds.) Traditional Authority and 
Democracy in Southern Africa (1998). 
54 Bako-Arifari, above n 53, 5-15; Hlatshwayo above n 53. 
55 Such linkage can for instance be found in Cameroon, see Ibid. 
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In the four abovementioned linkages, the extent to which customary 
administration is made subordinate and answerable to state organs varies. 
Several mechanisms can be employed to boost the accountability of customary 
administrators. When states formalize customary administration they can legally 
define the delegated authority as well as provide details as to the way it should 
be exercised. Such forms of administrative regulation can then be implemented 
legally when administrative abuses are questioned in court. Customary authorities 
may also be bound to regulations through political or administrative means. 
Payment of salary establishes a certain amount of administrative control, and can 
also be seen as a way to transform chiefs into civil servants, accountable to 
senior civil servants and subject to disciplinary sanctions. 56  Additionally, the 
provision of a salary could diminish chiefs’ incentives for self-enrichment or 
corruption in the discharge of their responsibilities and for clinging to outdated 
customs that accord financial benefits. Another political mechanism is the state 
exercising the power to ratify the appointment of traditional leaders, and thus 
also to withhold such ratification. The history of Ghana shows that in different 
political constellations this power can be exercised in different ways. Some 
Ghanaian regimes have exercised constraint, almost automatically endorsing local 
selections, while others have used such authority as an important tool for political 
interference in the selection of chiefs.57 When no such formal power lies with the 
state, state organs may seek replacements of customary administrators by 
exploiting fragmentations within the local polity, aligning themselves with a rival 
traditional power group to replace the original administrator. It should be noted 
that the motives for replacing customary administrators often involve power 
political considerations as well as issues of customary maladministration.58 
 
Formal recognition of the institution of traditional authority by the state can 
transform the position and legitimacy of traditional leaders. On the one hand, it 
can strengthen the position of traditional authorities or, in countries where such 
positions had previously been abolished such as in Guinea and Mozambique, it 
can assist their resurgence. On the other hand, formal recognition may cause 
leaders to lose their independence and risk them being identified with state 
failure. State influence on the selection of individual candidates impacts their 
independence further. Achieving accountability can therefore come at a cost of 
undermining the position of customary administrators. At the same time there is 
a real danger that administrative linkages will fail to deliver results in terms of 
accountability and prevention of power and human rights abuses. Mechanisms to 
ensure compliance with formalized limits of delegation and standards of 
administration remain weak, especially since they are often not strongly 
exercised. Here local and national power structures are influential. In countries 
where customary authorities have a strong national power base, either for 
historical reasons or through their role in national elections as voter brokers59, 
state authorities may not be able or even willing to ensure compliance through 
legal, administrative or political mechanisms. Even a highly formalized 
customary-state linkage may have little effect in such situations. Linking 
customary and state administration may even run the danger that local state 
institutions aligned with customary administration, and especially hybrid state-
customary institutions, are co-opted by customary power holders. Ironically then, 
linkages sought to deal with power abuses may only strengthen them. 
                                                
56 Englebert, above n 52. 
57 D I Ray, 'Chief-state relations in Ghana - Divided sovereignty and legitimacy' in E Van Rouveroy van 
Nieuwaal and W Zips (eds.) Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and Power in West African Societies: 
Perspectives from Legal Anthropology (1998) 48-69. 
58 For Togo see E Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 'Chiefs and African states: Some introductory notes 
and an extensive bibliography on African chieftaincy' (1987) 25/26 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1-46. 
59 Ubink, above n 52. 
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A balancing act  
 
Clearly, institutional linkages, whether sought through norms, disputing 
mechanisms or administration, are important mechanisms for improving the 
functioning of customary justice systems. Establishing linkages that help attain 
this goal, however, remains difficult. Linkages may alter existing customary 
arrangements, changing their nature in such a way that the original strengths of 
customary justice systems, its informal and accessible character, no longer exist. 
Alternatively, the effect of linkages may be thwarted or co-opted by customary 
elites and therefore fail to accomplish its goal. The main challenge for institutional 
linkage approaches therefore, is to find a balance between retaining the informal 
character, local accessibility and legitimacy of the customary justice system, while 
at the same time making sufficient change to improve its functioning.  
 
It should be noted that donors may find it difficult to make institutional linkages 
an object of project-type intervention, as these are often bound up in larger 
historical transformations occurring within national politics and their reform is 
usually a national affair where international donors play only a limited role. 
Linkages remain important, however, because they impact on the functioning of 
customary justice systems and can serve as entry points for inducing change. 
International donors should hence be aware of existing linkages as well as of 
what room there is within the national or local polity to alter them as a means of 
affecting the functioning of customary systems. Here, reform can also address 
state institutions that are linked to customary justice institutions, as improvement 
in the functioning of state institutions may benefit the functioning of the linked 
customary institution. 
 
Community-based approaches 
 
Another approach to improve the functioning of customary justice systems is to 
target activities directly at marginalized community members. Such activities 
include, for example, the deployment of paralegals, legal literacy training, 
community mapping of local land rights, and rights education campaigns.60 Such 
interventions can stimulate a demand for rights within the community, as 
proposed by Ignatieff,61 which can then translate into pressure on customary 
justice systems to better protect human rights. They can also empower 
marginalized community members and reduce power imbalances and elite 
capture. Such interventions are promising as they seem better equipped to 
directly benefit marginalized citizens governed by customary law, and may be 
able to address issues of power imbalances as they occur within the customary 
systems, without pushing for an alteration of the system’s basic tenets. 
 
UNDP has summarized its experiences with these kinds of interventions by 
studying projects in Africa, Asia and Latin America and examining what has 
worked and what has not. It found, for example, that: 
 
 Dialogues with elders and community leaders in Somalia helped to 
improve local dispute resolution mechanisms to make them more 
aligned with human rights standards and the protection of weaker 
groups.62  
 Legal awareness training through literacy courses, information groups, 
education campaigns, the publication of guidebooks on state and non-
                                                
60 Wojkowska, above n 7. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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state laws, and travelling street theatres helped improve the position of 
vulnerable groups and provided entry points for human rights in 
Bangladesh, Malawi, Timor Leste, Indonesia and Cambodia.63  
 Legal aid was enhanced through paralegals, lawyers’ networks, dispute 
clearing houses, dispute resolution panels and ADR training in Sierra 
Leone, Thailand, Timor Leste, Puerto Rico and Cambodia.  
 Capacity development for informal justice actors in the areas of 
mediation and citizen’s rights worked reasonably well in Burundi, Sierra 
Leone, Timor Leste, Rwanda and Bangladesh.  
 
UNDP also discusses challenges encountered and programmatic failures. It lists 
that in Thailand it was difficult to train lay persons into paralegals. Further, that 
capacity-building of informal justice institutions brings about challenges when 
ceremony becomes more important than capacity, when gender quotas for 
dispute resoluters undermine community cohesion, when reconciliation emphasis 
is unsatisfactory for aggrieved parties, when strengthening informal dispute 
mechanisms perpetuates the absence of formal institutions, and when newly built 
capacity lacks sustainability and local legitimacy.64  
 
An IIED/FAO sponsored report on practices to secure land rights in Africa 
discusses how civil society-type efforts have worked in the context of non-state 
law systems.65 The report shows that interventions such as paralegals, legal 
literacy, public interest litigation, legal clinics, and rights information centres have 
been successful in improving land tenure security in Africa’s customary regimes.66 
These studies, however, also show that interventions are no panacea and that 
persistent problems remain, including lack of capacity amongst paralegals, 67 
resistant local elites who fear undermining of their power base, 68  donor 
dependency and lack of sustainability,69 community lack of confidence and trust,70 
and ‘cut-throat antagonism’ between weak and/or poor communities and powerful 
outside investors. 71  Of these challenges elite resistance against change is 
especially troubling as elite dominance of the customary systems is a key 
impediments that interventions seek to overcome. 
 
Community-based approaches often utilize national or international state norms 
and institutions. They seek to contrast the functioning of customary justice to 
norms of state justice by, for example, raising awareness of state justice norms, 
organizing debates amongst customary authorities about international human 
rights standards, or providing legal aid to pursue litigation of customary abuses in 
state courts. Such strategies thus try to improve the functioning of customary 
justice systems by invoking the authority and power of justice institutions 
external to the local community.  
 
                                                
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 R H Aciro-Lakor, 'Land Rights Information Centers in Uganda' in  L Cotula and P Mathieu (eds.) 
Legal Empowerment in Practice, Using Legal Tools to Secure Land Rights in Africa (2008) 71-77; B Ba, 
'Paralegals as Agents of Legal Empowerment in the Banass Area of Mali' in Legal Empowerment in 
Practice, Using Legal Tools to Secure Land Rights in Africa in L Cotula and P Mathieu (eds.) Legal 
Empowerment in Practice, Using Legal Tools to Secure Land Rights in Africa (2008). 
66 E Mndeme, 'Awareness-Raising and Public Interest Litigation for Mining Communities in Tanzania' in 
Cotula and Matieu, above n 65, 93-98; L L Barros, 'Legal Clinics and Participatory Law-making for 
Indigenous Peoples in the Republic of Congo' in Cotula and Mathieu, above n 65, 119-22. 
67 Mndeme, above n 66.  
68 A K P Kludze, Restatement of African Law, Ghana. Volume I: Ewe Law of Property (1973). 
69 S Roberts, Restatement of African Law, Botswana. Volume I: Tswana Family Law (1972). 
70 N N Rubin, 'The Swazi law of succession: A restatement' (1965) 9(2)  Journal of African Law 90-113. 
71 W Twining, 'The restatement of African customary law: A comment' (1963) 1(2) The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 221-8. 
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Community-based approaches can also work within the customary justice system 
without recourse to the state, for example through local activists who work to 
improve customary dispute procedures and administrative checks and balances. 
Namibia offers two examples of this. In Uukwambi Traditional Authority, efforts 
have been undertaken to enhance the position of women in the customary justice 
system by instituting female deputies to male headmen. In the same area a few 
dozen people were trained as community legal activators to enhance the 
administration of justice in traditional courts. This training included a strong 
gender component. Another example is how Timap for Justice, a local legal aid 
NGO in Sierra Leone, deployed paralegals to eliminate adverse practices through 
negotiations with traditional authorities and educating them as to the harmful 
impact these practices have on communities.  
 
These types of community-based activities can be especially effective when they 
are able to make use of the opportunities offered by the flexibility and 
negotiability inherent in customary justice systems. Improvements can be 
achieved by identifying, voicing and supporting versions of living customary 
norms that favour marginalized groups and by supporting the marginalized in 
dispute related negotiations or when seeking to reinvigorate customary 
administrative checks and balances. The full possibility, potential impacts and 
limits of using the opportunities offered by the characteristics of customary 
justice systems, however, remain largely understudied. 
 
Community-based activities form an important addition to institutional 
approaches when seeking to improve the functioning of customary justice 
systems. They are a critical component of donor-led reforms as they can be 
integrated more easily than institutional linkages. Such interventions, however, 
cannot be seen as separate from institutional linkages as they occur within the 
context of established linkages between state and customary justice institutions, 
and often require such linkages to strengthen the functioning of customary 
justice. Community-based activities also help to improve the functioning of 
institutional linkages, by enhancing awareness of state norms and the invocation 
of state rights and related state dispute and administrative procedures in 
customary settings. Working within the customary system is equally important, 
therefore, as it may contribute to preventing resistance against state norms and 
institutions, and as opportunities for effective changes may be derived from the 
flexible and negotiable nature of customary justice. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Recognizing that customary justice plays an important role in the lives of many of 
the world’s poor, legal development actors have initiated projects to improve their 
functioning. This has occurred at a time when the poor have become central in 
legal development cooperation. 72  This paper has shown that improving the 
functioning of customary law presents certain challenges. Institutional 
approaches, linking customary and state norms, disputing mechanisms and 
administration, must find a careful balance between retaining the informal 
character, local accessibility and legitimacy of the customary justice system, while 
at the same time making sufficient change to reform its operation. Such balance 
is not easily found, especially in situations where local elites are able to resist or 
even co-opt linkages to state institutions. Community-based activities are less 
prone to upset this balance as they are unlikely to fundamentally alter the set-up 
of the customary justice system. Instead, they change its functioning by involving 
state norms and institutions or by inducing change from within the customary 
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system itself. Community-based activities occur, however, within the context of 
established linkages between state and customary justice institutions, and are 
often dependent upon such linkages for their effectiveness. 
 
The distribution of power plays a vital role in improving the functioning of 
customary justice. Often approaches, consciously or unconsciously, alter power 
relations within the local community. Consciously, projects aim to empower 
marginalized groups, and doing so may decrease the relative local power base of 
original elites. However, insufficient knowledge of the complexity of customary 
justice systems may mean that linkages are forged between state institutions and 
elite norms and institutions in the customary system, thereby strengthening the 
subordinate position of marginalized community members. Elite power is also a 
hindrance for institutional and community-based activities as customary power 
holders have been able to resist and co-opt reforms, especially when they are 
seen as a threat to the elite power base. 
 
Bottom-up legal development approaches stress the importance of dealing with 
the fact that law and power are intrinsically linked, expressing this most clearly 
through the concept of ‘legal empowerment’. This concept, which is employed 
(albeit with slightly different meanings) by international organizations including 
the Commission for Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank (WB), the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation of the UN (FAO), captures the possibility that legal tools can be used 
to empower marginalized citizens and attain greater control over the decisions 
and processes that affect their lives.73 Legal empowerment could also refer to 
activities undertaken to tackle power asymmetries that undermine the effective 
functioning of legal tools for marginalized citizens, preventing access to justice 
and ultimately their development.74 
 
Addressing problems in customary justice systems involves a form of legal 
empowerment. Organizations working on community-based activities have 
experimented with borrowing from state law attempts at legal empowerment, 
employing a combination of education and action through enhancing awareness, 
improving legal aid, and advocating for better rights. 75  It is important to 
recognize, however, that rights awareness, legal aid or rights advocacy may 
require rethinking when undertaken in the context of customary justice systems. 
Often such activities refer to state law: awareness of human rights or national 
legislation, legal aid to pursue actions in state courts or advocacy to obtain better 
legal protection under national legislation. However, it is possible to envisage 
customary legal awareness, customary legal aid or customary rights advocacy 
that focuses on the norms and institutions in the customary system to press for 
favourable change from within.  
 
Improving the functioning of customary law hence requires a particular kind of 
legal empowerment — ‘Customary Legal Empowerment’ — defined as processes 
that (1) enhance the operation of customary justice systems by improving the 
representation and participation of marginalized community members and 
integrating safeguards aimed at protecting the rights and security of marginalized 
                                                
73 See S Golub, 'Less law and reform, more politics and enforcement: A civil society approach to 
integrating rights and development' in P Alston and M Robinson (eds.) Human Rights and 
Development: Towards mutual reinforcement (2005) 297-324; Asian Development Bank, above n 23; 
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investment projects in Africa (2007). 
74 K Tuori, 'Law, Power and Critique' in K Tuori, Z Bankowski and J Uusitalo (eds.) Law and Power: 
Critical and Socio-Legal essays (1997) 7-29; Cotula, above n 73. 
75 Asian Development Bank, above n 23. 
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community members and/or (2) improve the ability of marginalized community 
members to make use of customary justice systems to uphold their rights and 
obtain outcomes that are fair and equitable. Additional research is needed to 
identify and understand the possibilities for customary legal empowerment, in 
particular possible entry points, lessons that can be carried over from state-based 
legal empowerment interventions, and strategies for overcoming the above-listed 
challenges.  
 
 
 
 
